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CLIMATE CHANGE
a n d  i t s  i m p a c t s
Some highlights from the ongoing 
UK research programme: a first look at
results from the Hadley Centre’s new
climate model
November 1998
Recognising the importance of assessing the threat of
future climate change and its impacts, the UK
Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions established in 1997 a series of linked research
projects which predict changes in climate over the next
decades and assess the potential global impact in key
s e c t o r s .These sectors covered natural ecosystems, water
resources, food supply and coastal areas. The first report
from this study was published in December 1997 as
Climate change and its impacts, and was distributed at the
Third Conference of Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto.
Since then, the Hadley Centre has generated a new
scenario of climate change based on predictions under-
taken in 1998 from the most recent version of its climate
model. The climate scenario is based on an increase in
greenhouse gases according to the IPCC ‘business-as-
usual’ emissions scenario, without changes in sulphate
aerosols. As in 1997, assessment models have been used
to look at the impacts arising from this greenhouse gas-
only climate scenario, and the range of sectors has been
extended to include human health — specifically, malaria.
The assessment has concentrated on the period
2041–2070, described for convenience as the 2050s.
The model has also recently been run to include in
addition the cooling effect of sulphate aerosols based on
a revised projection of human-made sulphur emissions.
Sulphates make little difference to future warming at a
global scale, but there are some differences regionally.
This report can be considered as an update of the one
issued in December 1997; much of the background,
many of the assumptions and caveats discussed in that
report are still current. The contributions to research
from the UK Public Meteorological Service programme
are fully acknowledged. 
• The 1997/98 El Niño was the most extreme on re c o rd .
The global mean surface temperature in 1998 is likely to
e xceed that in 1997 and be the highest since global
i n s t rumental re c o rds began. 
• Predictions of climate change have been made using an
i m p roved climate model without corrections.  IPCC
‘ b u s i n e s s - a s - u s u a l’ increases in greenhouse gas emissions
result in a further warming of about 3 °C over the next
100 years. The inclusion of sulphate aerosols makes little
d i f f e rence to this global prediction. 
• Comparisons of model simulations and observa t i o n s ,
based on new statistical techniques, indicate that human-
made greenhouse gases have contributed substantially to
global warming over the past 50 years.  Initial results also
indicate that climate models can simulate reasonably we l l
the climate change of the past 150 years, and this give s
us confidence in predictions of the future. 
• The new climate model has a better re p resentation of
ocean currents. In c reases in greenhouse gases result in a
s l owing down of the No rth Atlantic ocean circ u l a t i o n ,
but even with this, Eu rope still warms.  
• Based on the new climate scenario for the 2050s, tro p i c a l
f o rests will die back in many areas of northern Brazil. In
other areas of the world tropical grasslands will be trans-
formed to desert or temperate grassland.
• Vegetation will absorb CO2 at the rate of some 
2–3 billion tonnes of carbon (GtC) per year in the first
half of the next century; this compares to curre n t
human-made emissions of about 7 GtC per ye a r. After
2050, and as a result of vegetation dieback, this will
become a source of about 2 GtC per  ye a r, there by
enhancing CO2 build up in the atmosphere. This
enhancement is not yet included in climate predictions 
• Water re s o u rce stresses in many of the poorest countries,
a l ready expected to increase, will be exacerbated by
c l imate change. Due to climate change alone, some 
66 million extra people will live in countries with water
s t ress, and some 170 million people will live in countries
which are extremely stressed.    
• Under this climate change scenario crop yields will
i n c rease in high and mid-latitude countries such as
Canada and Eu rope, but decrease in lower latitudes.
Although globally the food system will accommodate
regional variations in yields, some regions, part i c u l a r l y
the Tropics, will experience marked reductions in yield,
l ower production and higher risk of hunger. Africa will
be worst affected, with 18% more people at risk of
hunger due to climate change alone by the 2050s. 
• Global mean sea-level rise by the 2050s is predicted to be
21 cm. If coastal protection evo l ves as in the past, then
over 20 million extra people each year will be at risk of
flooding due to sea-level rise. South and South East Asia
a re most vulnerable in absolute terms. To manage these
flood risks, pro a c t i ve adaptation for sea-level rise is
re q u i red around much of the world’s coastal re g i o n s .
• While growth in population will itself increase the 
number of people at risk of malaria, climate change will
i n c rease the pro p o rtion of the world population at risk,
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S u m m a ry
· The 1997/98 El Niño was the most extreme on re c o rd .
The global mean surface temperature in 1998 is likely to
e xceed that in 1997 and be the highest since global
i n s t rumental re c o rds began. 
· Predictions of climate change have been made using an
i m p roved climate model without corrections. IPCC
‘ b u s i n e s s - a s - u s u a l’ increases in greenhouse gas emissions
result in a further warming of about 3 °C over the next
100 years. 
· Comparisons of model simulations and observa t i o n s
indicate that human-made greenhouse gases have 
contributed substantially to global warming over the past
50 years. Initial results also indicate that climate models
can simulate reasonably well the climate change of the
past 140 years, and this gives us confidence in pre d i c t i o n s
of the future. 
· The new climate model has a better re p resentation of
ocean currents. In c reases in greenhouse gases result in a
s l owing down of the No rth Atlantic ocean circ u l a t i o n ,
but even with this, Eu rope still warms.  
Recent observations of climate
The year since Kyoto has witnessed the largest El Ni ñ o ,
the warming of the eastern tropical Pacific, on re c o rd. The
effects of this on global communities, from forest fires in
Indonesia to torrential rains in Pe ru and East Africa, have
been well publicised. We cannot say yet whether global
warming has led to more frequent or larger El Niños. T h e
f i g u re alongside shows an underlying trend of rising
t e m p e r a t u res, but also shows that large El Niños we re
seen at the end of the last century. The global effect of
El Niño, howe ve r, demonstrates how vulnerable society
is to changes in climate. 
1997 was the warmest year in the global instru m e n t a l
re c o rd going back to 1860. Due in part, but certainly not
w h o l l y, to the large El Niño, global surface temperature s
h a ve been at a consistently high level in 1998. Each of the
first eight months of the year has been the warmest, or
equal warmest, such month on re c o rd. Despite the fact
that El Niño is now moving into a colder ‘La Ni ñ a’ phase,
which will have a corresponding cooling effect on global
climate, the annual temperature for 1998 is almost cert a i n
to be warmer than in 1997, and hence the warmest on
re c o rd. Howe ve r, due to natural climate va r i a b i l i t y, temper-
a t u res are not expected to rise successively each ye a r, and it
seems likely that 1999 will be cooler than 1998.
Predictions from the new Hadley Centre 
climate model
A climate model aims to re p resent all the main compo-
nents of the climate system which can affect change in the
f u t u re. Up to now, coupling together models of two main
components of the climate system, the atmosphere and the
ocean, has caused the climate model’s own simulated
climate to drift away from re a l i t y. To pre vent this, cor-
rections — so-called ‘f l u x - a d j u s t m e n t s’ — we re intro d u c e d ,
and these raised issues about the confidence we had i n
using such models for predictions. In the third Ha d l e y
C e n t re coupled climate model, the ocean is re p resented at a
much higher resolution than pre v i o u s l y, 1.25° latitude x 1.25°
longitude, which gives a greatly improved re p re s e n t ation of
ocean currents such as the Gulf St ream. This, together
with improvements in the re p resentation of processes in t h e
a t m o s p h e re and on land, has allowed the model’s clim a t e
to remain stable without the need for flux-adjustments.
Climate change science
Changes in sea-surface temperature 1871–1998, relative to the
1961–90 average, for the eastern tropical Pacific off Peru.
Changes in the global annual mean surface temperature, relative
to that at the end of the last century, are shown by blue bars,
with a smoothed curve in red. The value for 1998, shown in
green, includes observations up to the end of September.
The new model has been used to make simulations and
p redictions of climate over the period 1860–2100, and
some of the results are shown on this page. When drive n
by observed increases in greenhouse gases to the pre s e n t ,
and IPCC-projected increases in the future, the model
p redicts that a rise in global temperature of about 1 °C
should  h a ve occurred alre a d y, and a further rise of about 
3 °C is to be expected by 2100; rises over land (where the
main impacts are expected) will be almost twice as fast as
those over sea. 
The regional patterns of change are also shown on this
page; high-latitude winters will warm faster due to feed-
back from the melting of sea-ice, and there will be some
ocean areas where rises are quite limited. Rainfall changes
will be most marked in tropical regions. These patterns,
and the global mean rises, are not ve ry different from those
p reviously predicted with flux-adjusted models. Using the
n ew model we see re l a t i vely large decreases in rainfall ove r
A m a zonia and parts of Africa, but this may be due to
changes in the model other than omitting flux-adjustment.
Predictions from the new model have been used to inve s t i g a t e
impacts on a number of socio-economic areas, and these are
described in later sections of this re p o rt .
The new climate model has, very recently, also been
run including changes in sulphate aerosols from revised
projections of SO2 emissions — about a half of those
used in IPCC 1995. Although the direct cooling effect of
sulphate aerosols is much reduced, we also now include
cooling from the indirect effect via changes in cloud
brightness. The diagram alongside shows how the simula-
tion of change to date is in broad agreement with the
o b s e rved temperature rise. Other factors, such as changes
in solar output and volcanic activity, will be included in
f u t u re simulations, and are expected to give better agre e-
ment in mid-20th century. Howe ve r, natural va r i a b i l i t y
means that simulated and observed temperatures will not
always agree. Because total global sulphur emissions are not
expected to change substantially in future, the warming
over the next 100 years is much the same as without sulphate
a e rosols — about 3 °C (see figure below). There are some
d i f f e rences in regional detail, howe ve r. 
Changes in land, sea and global mean surface temperature from
the new Hadley Centre model driven with changes in greenhouse
gas concentrations (without sulphate aerosols): observed
to1995 and IPCC ‘business-as-usual’ to 2100. The black line
shows the low climate drift of the unperturbed model. 
The patterns of change in northern winter temperature (top) and
precipitation (bottom) for the 2050s, compared to the present
day, when the climate model is driven with IPCC ‘business-as-
usual’ changes in greenhouse gases only.
The global mean surface temperature change when the model
includes the effect of greenhouse gases (red), and also including
the direct and indirect effects of sulphate aerosols (blue).
Observations are shown in green.   
Making better estimates of climate change
The reason why climate predictions are so uncertain is that,
once climate change begins, consequential changes will feed
back, either positively or negative l y, on the original warming.
These feedbacks are poorly understood. Although we
b e l i e ve the most important feedbacks in the atmosphere ,
ocean, land surface and sea-ice are already included (albeit
i m p e rfectly) in the climate model, there are others which
should be taken into account, and this can only be done
by including all components of the climate system in a
fully interactive model. Most recently we have included a
sulphur cycle which creates sulphate aerosol from natural
and industrial SO2 emissions. The next step is to add the
carbon cycle and chemistry; climate change has the poten-
tial to disturb the natural carbon cycle in such a way as to
alter atmospheric concentration of CO2, and to disturb the
c h e m i s t ry of the atmosphere so as to alter concentrations
of other greenhouse gases such as ozone and methane. 
Sub-models currently under development will be 
incorporated (over the next few years) in the main model
to form the first Hadley Centre Earth Systems Model.
Ultimately we plan to include feedbacks from 
socio-economic sectors such as agriculture and energy use.
The strength of the Atlantic circulation is seen to decrease 
substantially as greenhouse gas concentrations rise at 2% per
year to four times the pre-industrial value (green). The black line
shows the unperturbed circulation, and the red line the change
when greenhouse gases follow the IPCC ‘business-as-usual’ 
emissions scenario. 
Uncertainty in climate change predictions
Recent work at the Hadley Centre has shown that, when
d r i ven by all the observed changes in climate forcing factors
(natural and human-made), the climate model does re a-
sonably well at simulating changes in climate over the last
140 years, taking into account the vagaries of natural inter-
nal climate va r i a b i l i t y. It is also able to mimic changes in t h e
m o re distant past, for example during the warm period
some 6,000 years ago. This limited model validation give s
i n c reased confidence in predictions of future climate change.
Rapid changes in ocean circulation
T h e re is considerable interest in how stable ocean thermo-
haline circulation (the ‘c o n ve yor belt’) will remain in the
face of rises in greenhouse gas concentrations. The possi-
bility has been raised of a southwards movement in the
Gulf St ream leaving Eu rope exposed to a colder climate.
The improved re p resentation of the ocean currents in the
n ew Hadley Centre model has allowed us to inve s t i g a t e
this with more realism. We find that, even when CO2 i s
i n c reased at an unrealistically rapid rate of 2% per ye a r,
and then stabilised at four times the present concentration,
the strength of the Atlantic ocean circulation decreases by
about 25% (see diagram alongside). This slowd own does
d e c rease the amount of heat transported into nort h - we s t
Eu rope, but this is more than offset by direct gre e n h o u s e
warming, so that temperatures in Eu rope still rise.
Howe ve r, changes in ocean circulation do alter warming
patterns in the No rth Atlantic, and hence will contribute
to changes in Eu ropean we a t h e r, including, for example,
storminess. Some other climate models show a more
drastic reduction in ocean circulation, and the reason for
this range of responses is not fully understood. 
Identifying the causes of recent climate change
The change seen over the past 140 years, shown earlier,
amounts to some 0.6 °C. Is this due to human activities
such as the burning of fossil fuels? There are many factors
that influence climate, and distinguishing the human-
made signal from background natural climate variability is
a challenge. To do this we use advanced statistical techniques
which look at changes in patterns of temperature, both at
the surface of the earth and through the depth of t h e
a t m o s p h e re, giving greater importance to those are a s
w h e re natural variability is low and vice versa. This statis-
tical analysis indicates that, over the past 50 years, human-
made greenhouse gases have contributed substantially to
global warming. There is still considerable uncertainty in
this estimate, but this recent study supports and stre n g t h e n s
the IPCC 95 statement that the balance of evidence 
suggests a discernible climate change due to human activities.
Although it is still not possible to unambiguously a s s i g n
recent change to human activity, we are working tow a rds a
m o re robust assessment through better model simulations,
better observations, and better estimates, from models and
o b s e rvations, of the natural variability of climate.
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S u m m a ry
· Under the latest climate scenario for the 2050s, tropical
forests will die back in many areas of northern Brazil.
In other areas of the world, tropical grasslands will be
transformed into desert or temperate grassland.
· Vegetation will absorb CO2 at the rate of some 2–3 GtC
per year in the first half of the next century; this com-
pares to current human-made emissions of about 
7 GtC per ye a r. After 2050, and as a result of ve g e t a t i o n
dieback, this will become a source of about 2 GtC per
ye a r, there by enhancing CO2 build-up in the 
atmosphere. This enhancement is not yet included in
climate predictions 
Climate predictions from the new Hadley Centre model
with increases in greenhouse gases only, for the period
1860–2100, together with projections of increasing CO2
concentration and nitrogen deposition, were used to
drive the ITE ecosystem model, a model which has been
well tested and peer-reviewed. The maps below show the
global distribution of desert and eight vegetation types
predicted by the ecosystem model for the present day and
for the 2050s. Many regions which currently support
tropical forests are predicted to change to savannah,
grassland or even desert. The ecosystem model predicts
that this dieback will occur over vast areas of northern
Brazil, beginning in the 2040s, resulting from
decreases in rainfall of up to 500 mm per year
and increases in temperature of up to 7 °C.
Many regions of tropical grassland will be
transformed into desert or temperate grassland,
in areas of India, Africa and No rth America.
Temperate grassland will also expand into
regions of Eu rope and North America which
a re currently dominated by temperate or
c o n i f e rous forest, resulting in a significant loss
of productivity and biomass. By contrast,
t h e re is a nort h w a rds expansion of conifero u s
and temperate forest in both No rth America
and Asia, and a large area where these fore s t
types remain dominant. In these regions, the
f o rests grow faster and increase in biomass, a s
a result of the enhancement of photosynthesis
by CO2, more favourable temperatures and
n i t rogen deposition. 
The ecosystem model was also used to predict the rate
of changes in the amount of carbon stored in global
vegetation and soils over the period 1860 to 2100. The
model predicts that the land acts as a weak carbon sink
until about 1990, after which the sink will increase to
sequester around 2–3 billion tonnes of carbon (GtC) per
year between 2000 and 2050. (For comparison, current
emissions of CO2 due to human activity are about 7 GtC
per year.) After 2050, and as a result of vegetation
dieback and change, primarily in Amazonia, Europe and
North America, the terrestrial land surface becomes a
source of carbon, releasing approximately 2 GtC per year
into the atmosphere. Consequently, after 2050, changes
in natural ecosystems predicted by the model will
enhance the build-up of CO2 in the atmosphere. This
enhancement is not yet included in climate models.  
Impacts of climate change
on natural vegetation
Global distribution of vegetation types predicted by the ITE
ecosystem model for the present day and for the 2050s. 
Predicted changes in the rate of increase in the carbon store on
land, showing when the land is a source or sink of carbon.
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Summary
· Water re s o u rce stresses in many of the poorest countries,
al ready expected to increase, will be exacerbated by
climate change. Due to climate change alone, some
66 million extra people will live in countries with
water stress, and some 170 million people will live in
countries which are extremely stre s s e d .
One of the greatest potential impacts of climate change on
human society is through its effect on water re s o u rces. At
p resent, approximately one third of the world’s population
l i ve in countries experiencing water stress, and it has been
forecast that by 2025 as much as two thirds of a much
larger world population could be exposed to water stress,
simply due to the increase in population. Climate change
has the potential to exacerbate further
these stresses in some parts of the world.
The implications of the new Hadley
Centre climate scenario for water
resources stress were assessed by first
simulating river runoff with a macro-
scale hydrological model, calculating
changes in national water resource
availability (taking into account
i m p o rts from upstream), and comparing
the estimated volume of water available
for use with the amount withdrawn
by water users. The baseline water
availability and use data, together with
the scenarios for future water use,
were taken from work undertaken for
the 1997 Comprehensive Assessment
of the Freshwater Resources of the
World.
The first map shows the estimated
change in 30-year mean annual runoff
by the 2050s as compared with the
baseline period 1961 to 1990. Runoff
increases in high latitudes, South East
Asia and some equatorial regions, but
decreases substantially in Europe, most
of Africa, the Middle East, eastern
North America, and much of the
Amazon basin. These changes can be
very large in percentage terms. The
rise in temperature will also affect the
timing of streamflow through the year,
with particularly large changes in
those parts of the world — eastern
Eu rope, the northern United States, and parts of east
Asia — where the higher temperatures mean that a
much smaller pro p o rtion of winter precipitation falls as
s n ow to be stored on the land surface until the spring
melt. In these areas, winter flows will increase and
spring flows decre a s e .
One measure of national water resource stress is the
ratio of water used to water available (although this hides
within-country variations and the risk of stress during
drought conditions), and countries using more than 20%
of their total annual water supply are generally held to be
exposed to water stress. The second map shows the effect
of climate change on water stress by the 2050s, relative to
the effects of population growth, and indicates that water
resource stresses in many of the poorest countries would
be exacerbated by climate change. Climate change would
lead to an additional 66 million people living in countries
using more than 20% of their total potential resource by
2050, and an additional 170 million people would be
living in countries using more than 40% of their
re s o u rc e s .
Impacts of climate change
on water resources
Estimated change in 30-year mean annual runoff (millimetres per year) by the 2050s,
compared with the baseline period.
Change in water stress, due to climate change, in countries using more than 20% of their
water resources. 
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Summary
· Due to changes in climate and CO2 c rop yields are
expected to increase in high- and mid-latitude countries
but decrease in lower latitudes. Although globally the
food system will accommodate regional variations in
yields, some regions, particularly in the Tropics, will
experience marked reductions in yield, lower pro d u c t i o n
and higher risk of hunger. Africa will be worst affected,
with 18% more people at risk of hunger due to climate
change alone. 
Dynamic crop growth models are used to simulate the
effects of climate change, as projected by the new Hadley
Centre climate model, and increased atmospheric CO2,
on the yield of major cereal crops. A world food trade
model is then used to simulate the economic consequences
of changes in yields and thus estimate the changes in
world food output, in world food prices and in the
number of people at risk from hunger. All models and
methods used in this analysis have been validated and
p e e r - re v i ewe d .
Changes in crop yields predicted for the 2050s are
shown below. Decreases in yields are seen by the 2020s in
Russia, and in Canada by the 2080s. Western Africa and
tropical South America appear worst affected. Yields in
some regions, such as Canada and Australia, may initially
increase then decrease through the decades, due to the
changing balance between positive effects of CO2 ‘fertili-
sation’ and the negative effects of moisture stress. This
clearly has implications for adaptation policies.
The world food model incorporates climate re s p o n s e s
as changes in average national or regional yield per
commodity as described above. Economic adjustments
include changes in agricultural investment, allocation of
land to different crops, land reclamation and prices. A
‘risk of hunger’ index is based upon methods developed
by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.
Assuming no change in climate, world cereal pro d u c t i o n
is estimated to grow from about 1,800 mmt (million
metric tonnes) in 1990 to about 3,500 mmt in 2050,
matching global food re q u i rements throughout the period.
Food prices are estimated to rise but the re l a t i ve risk of
hunger will decrease. These projections are consistent
with those of FAO. They assume a 50 per cent liberalisation
of trade by 2020 and an annual increase in cereal yields of
just under one per cent. 
The climate change scenario leads to world cereal 
production being progressively reduced from projections
without climate change — by the 2050s the world could
be experiencing a shortfall of 90 mmt compared to the
reference scenario. Food prices increase by 17 per cent
above the level they otherwise would have been, and the
number of people at risk of hunger is projected to
i n c rease due to climate change by 30 million by the 2050s. 
The global estimates presented above mask import a n t
regional differences in impacts. In general, small decre a s e s
in yield and production are compensated for by socio-
economic developments. However, regional disparities are
evident. Yield decreases at lower latitudes, and in part i c u l a r
in the arid and sub-humid Tropics, lead to pro d u c t i o n
decreases and an increase in the risk of hunger, effects
that may be exacerbated where adaptive capacity is lower
than the global average. For example, in Africa cere a l
p roductivity is estimated to be reduced by about 
10 per cent from the re f e rence case by 2050, and 
place 18% more people at risk of hunger.
In especially vulnerable areas and over short periods
(e.g. in spells of drought or flooding) many of the effects
of climate change will be more adverse than those indicated
a b ove .
Impacts of climate change
on food supply
Potential change in yields of cereals (wheat, maize, rice) for the 2050s, including effects of CO2.
Contributor: Robert Nicholls, Middlesex University, London
Summary
· Global mean sea-level rise by the 2050s is predicted to
be 21 cm. If coastal protection evolves only according
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as in the past, then
over 20 million extra people each year will be at risk of
flooding due to sea-level rise. 
· The coasts of the southern Mediterranean, West and
East Africa, east Asia and, most particularly, south and
South East Asia are most vulnerable in absolute terms.
The islands of the Caribbean, and the small islands of
the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, are also vulnerable
in terms of large re l a t i ve increases in flood risk.
Se a - l e vel rise increases the risk of coastal flooding if the
other factors determining flood risk (storminess and
flood defences) remain the same. Recent estimates are
that 21% of the world’s population live within 30 km
of the coast, and these populations are growing at twice
the global trend, so increases in flood risk could have
significant human impacts. The new Hadley Centre
climate model predicts a global rise in sea level of 21 cm
by the 2050s due to rises in greenhouse gases from human
activities. This estimate includes direct prediction of
thermal expansion combined with estimates of land-
based ice-melt, using a model developed by the
Un i versity of Ut recht driven by the predicted climate
change; an improvement on earlier estimates. Sea-level
rise will not be the same everywhere; in some areas it
could be up to twice this global mean, in other are a s
re l a t i vely little; later estimates of coastal impacts will
include this variation. 
The number of people at risk,
defined as the average number of
people flooded per year by storm
surge, is estimated for this sea-level
rise scenario. Storm climatology is
assumed to remain constant and
population growth in the coastal
zone is assumed to be double the
national increase. The standard of
protection from flooding in the
1990s is estimated using GDP, in
the absence of suitable global data.
Results are presented for two cases:
constant protection (no change
with time) and evolving protection
(where protection is upgraded in line with increase in
G D P, but with no specific allowance for global sea-leve l
rise). The way in which protection is assumed to evolve is
in line with historical developments.
The impacts produced by sea-level rise are shown in
the diagram alongside. With constant protection and no
further sea-level rise, the model predicts an increase in
the annual number of people at risk of flooding fro m
10 million people in 1990 to 32 million people in the
2050s; taking into account sea-level rise this increases to
78 million, i.e. an extra 46 million people at risk. T h re e
q u a rters of these people are concentrated in a few vulnerable
regions, particularly south and South East Asia, w h e re there
a re many densely populated deltas, and West Africa, where
the coastal population is growing rapidly. In addition,
t h e re are re l a t i vely large increases in the numbers of people
at risk in all the regions comprised of small islands: the
Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.
With evolving coastal protection and no sea-level rise,
the number of people at risk amounts to some 27 million
people by the 2050s; when the effects of sea-level rise are
included, this rises to 50 million people, i.e. an additional
23 million people. The same six regions contain most of
these people, but under this scenario the majority are
concentrated in one region: south Asia. The areas with
many small islands again experience large re l a t i ve incre a s e s
in the number of people at risk. 
While adaptation is feasible in many of these vulnerable
a reas, it will invo l ve long-term planning and substantial
costs. The Netherlands exemplifies one approach to
c o n t rolling flooding in deltas, depending on well 
developed institutions and a large amount of infrastru c t u re .
Many small islands have inherently more limited 
indigenous re s o u rces for adaptation than larger islands
and continental settings. 
Impacts on coastal 
communities
Annual number of people at risk under the sea-level rise scenario, assuming constant
flood protection (LH bar) and evolving protection (RH bar)
Summary
· While growth in population will itself increase the number
of people at risk of malaria, climate change will incre a s e
the pro p o rtion of the world population at risk, part i c u l a r l y
in areas where currently the disease is not endemic.  
Climate change is likely to have various adverse impacts
on human health. One direct impact is likely to be
changes in the distribution and activity of the insect, tick
and rodent carriers of certain human diseases. There is a
long history of using mathematical models to understand
the transmission of mosquito-borne infections, such as
malaria, in humans. Predicting the human risk of disease
is far more difficult than predicting changes in the geo-
graphical range distribution of carriers and of the viability
of the infectious agent. This is because human activities
do much to influence the risk of disease. For example, in
many countries, malaria has been eradicated or controlled. 
An assessment of impact of climate change on potential
malaria transmission has been made using the peer-
re v i ewed MIASMA model developed in the Ne t h e r l a n d s .
The term ‘p o t e n t i a l’ is here used to refer to the model’s
p redictions of where malaria could occur, based on climatic
f a c t o r s . The model does not take into account local demo-
graphic, socio-economic and technical circumstances that
could limit transmission. The capacity of the enviro n m e n t
to sustain malaria transmission is the key factor in the
assessment of how changes in ambient temperature and
p recipitation patterns would affect malaria risk. A high
capacity to sustain transmission of the disease indicates
that, despite a smaller or less efficient mosquito population,
the disease may remain endemic in a specified area. There is
much diversity around the world in how local mosquitoes and
local populations behave in relation to the transmission of
malaria. As a first approximation, global level modelling neces-
sarily assumes standard behaviours for the mosquito species.
Although it is difficult to validate the highly aggre g a t e d
global model outcomes (due to lack of data, for example),
the MIASMA model has been validated at the country
l e vel and for certain specific re g i o n s .
Global estimates of the potential for malaria transmission
we re made based on predictions using the new climate
change scenario from the Hadley Centre. The global maps
b e l ow show the potential transmission of P. f a l c i p a ru m m a l a r i a ,
firstly under baseline climate conditions (1961–1990) a n d ,
s e c o n d l y, under the climate scenario for the 2050s.  
The largest changes in transmission potential are fore c a s t
at the latitudinal and altitudinal fringes of current risk
a reas. The minimum temperature for parasite deve l o p m e n t
is the limiting factor for malaria transmission in m a n y
highland areas. At higher altitudes, such as the eastern
highlands of Africa, or in the Andes region of So u t h
America, an increase in temperature of several degre e s
Celsius could increase the transmission potential sufficiently
to conve rt initially malaria-free areas into areas that
experience seasonal epidemics. In such non-endemic
a reas, populations have little or no immunity to malaria
and epidemics in these regions are characterised by
high morbidity (sickness) and mortality (death) in both
c h i l d ren and adults. 
The map shows that the greatest changes in potential
malaria risk re l a t i ve to baseline climate are forecast to
occur in temperate zones. Howe ve r, malaria is unlikely to
be re i n t roduced into developed countries which have
adequate surveillance systems and maintain control 
p rogrammes. Malaria is the world’s most pre va l e n t
mosquito-borne disease; at present approximately 
40% of the world’s population is at risk of infection.
On a global scale, there is a projected increase of the 
population at risk of malaria. High rates of population
g rowth in endemic areas already entail an increase in 
population at risk in the absence of climate change.
Howe ve r, climate change superimposed on this pattern of
population growth will increase the population at risk of
malaria even further.
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